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Introduction and Research Aims  
There have been calls for a greater accountability 
of civil society organisations (CSOs), due to their 
rapid growth in terms of size, visibility and 
political influence, coupled with a series of high-
profile scandals (Edwards, 2000). One of the ways 
to deal with accountability is self-regulation: 
voluntary norms (e.g. codes of conduct, 
accreditation schemes, peer-assessment etc.) 
defined by CSOs for CSOs at sectoral level to 
regulate their behavior (Gunningham & Rees, 
1997). Over the past decades, there has been a 
proliferation of self-regulatory instruments 
worldwide (Warren & Lloyd, 2009). Self-
Regulation is currently evolving and emerging in 
several contexts both at a national and 
international level. At the international level, the 
Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and 
Accountability (2014) has merged the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
International with People in Aid, integrating also 
The Sphere Project (The Sphere Project, 2014). In 
December 2017, the Global Standard for CSO 
Accountability was launched which has the 
ambition of serving as a point of orientation to 
improve accountability of CSOs working in the 
global south and north (Accountable Now, 2017). 
In November 2018, British charities developed the 
first ever Charity Digital Code of Practice (Charity 
Digital Code of Practice, 2018) whereas, in January 
2019, the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations (England and Wales) released the 
Ethical Principles for the Charity Sector (NCVO, 
2019; Carolei, 2019). 
 
The importance of self-regulation emerges from 
numerous factors, the most important being its 
purpose of institutionalising best accountability 
practices and rendering them systematic among 
CSOs. In that respect, self-regulation is more than 
a simple tool of accountability, it is a process 
linked to civil society identity and normative views 
on organisational behavior (Ebrahim, 2003). But, 
self-regulation is also used to avoid restrictive 
state policies, especially when CSOs operate in 
hostile political environments (Bies, 2010). 
Similarly, self-regulation can occur when the State 
structure is collapsed and CSOs are operating in a 
‘vacuum of regulation’ (Harris-Curtis, 2009). So, 
self-regulation, as a normative institution of (and 
for) civil society, reflects the nature of CSOs as civil 
agency in terms of self-determination, hence 
democracy, in setting regulatory norms for 
themselves at grassroots level, and in terms of 
normative developments as civil society autonomy 
in devising forms of progressive change within the 
law. Consequently, that the subject of self-
regulation is central to discourses of democracy 
and development as well as to academic discourse 
about the nature and role of civil society. 
 
Despite the increasing popularity, a sizable portion 
of self-regulatory instruments have been criticised 
due to systematic monitoring and sanctioning 
disfunctions (Hammad & Morton, 2011). The 
spectre of non-compliance cast doubts not only 
on self-regulation as a means of accountability, 
but it does also increase scepticism on self-
regulation effectiveness. 
 
Researchers have developed two approaches 
under which the matter of effectiveness can be 
assessed: the economic approach (also known as 
‘club theory’) and the institutional approach (also 
known as ‘constructivist approach’). On the one 
hand, the economic approach suggests that self-
regulation arises as a response to mitigate 
perception of opportunism within the sector and 
CSOs create and/or join ‘voluntary clubs’ to send a 
reputational signal of quality to the principal(s): 
donors, lawmaker, and other targeting 
stakeholders (Gugerty & Prakash, 2012). In terms 
of institutional architecture, two conditions typify 
credible self-regulatory initiatives: clear standards 
of behavior and stringent enforcement 
mechanisms (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Under 
this approach, a self-regulation is effective if a 
high number of CSOs comply with voluntary 
standards (which are, in turns, adequately 
enforced) and, simultaneously, a successful 
signalling is sent to the initiative’s 
principal/targeting stakeholder, resulting either 
into an increase of public trust/funding for CSOs 
or into a decline of intrusive State regulation 
(Gugerty & Prakash, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the institutional approach sees 
CSOs as normative institutions that collaborate to 
define self-regulatory standards with the aim of 
setting principles and practices that define the 
“right conduct” and such a process spells out the 
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sector’s public commitment to moral restraint and 
aspiration (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Feeney, 
1997). According to the institutional theory, a self-
regulatory instrument is effective when it creates 
an institutional setting that promotes social 
learning and norm-compliant behaviour, 
encouraging CSOs to internalise behavioural 
norms (Crack, 2018). 
 
So far, these approaches have been applied by 
scholars to analyse whether self-regulation is 
effective in relation to various empirical and 
theoretical tasks. First, there is a body of the 
literature that has employed the economic and 
the institutional approach to explore drivers and 
motivations behind the emergence of different 
self-regulation models in Europe (Bies, 2010), Asia 
(Sidel, 2010), Africa (Gugerty, 2008) and across 
the three continents (Gugerty et al, 2010). 
Comparative scholars have lately studied the 
interplay between State-based regulation and 
self-regulation (or co-regulation) looking at 
different jurisdictions (Breen et al, 2017). Drawing 
upon the economic approach, scholars have laid 
down an analytical framework to identify the ideal 
institutional architecture — in terms of 
monitoring and sanctioning — that typifies 
credible voluntary clubs (Prakash & Gugerty, 
2010). Using the economic and the institutional 
approach as a theoretical outline, a recent study 
has investigated the perception of effectiveness of 
the INGO Accountability Charter exploring the 
motivations of NGOs in joining the Charter and to 
what extent participant NGOs perceive it as 
effective in enacting accountability (Crack, 2018). 
Similarly, a scholar has gathered perceptions of 
self-regulation effectiveness looking at USA-based 
instruments asking why CSOs adhere to voluntary 
regulation and whether the subsequent regulatory 
experience matches their initial expectations 
(Kennedy, 2018). The institutional approach was 
deemed more appropriate than the economic one 
in explaining how International Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) defined and 
institutionalised voluntary standards of 
accountability within the context of the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
(Deloffre, 2016). The same approach was also 
employed to prove that self-regulation arises as a 
response to environmental and institutional 
pressures (Bromely & Orachard, 2016). 
 
As to norm-compliance, researchers have put 
much of their intellectual efforts in understanding 
what factors account for the variation in the 
strength of monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms (Boire, Prakash & Gugerty, 2016), 
while, other scholars have measured to extent to 
which NGOs comply with regulatory standards 
focusing on the Global Reporting Initiative: 
findings point out low level of norm-compliance 
(Traxle, Greiling & Hebesberger, 2018). On a 
theoretical level, it was argued that non-
compliance might result from willful/strategic 
shirking and from mere confusion or ignorance 
(Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). However, there is 
scant empirical research that investigates the 
reasons behind non-compliance. Recognising this 
gap, Crack has investigated the challenges faced 
by CSOs in complying with self-regulatory 
standards gathering data in the field. In that 
respect, Crack argues that ‘there has been an 
overwhelming proliferation of initiatives, that 
observance of the standards can be excessively 
bureaucratic, the initiatives may not adequately 
accommodate the organizational diversity in the 
sector, and the extent to which the standards are 
sufficient to embed a culture of accountability to 
affected populations is doubtful’ (2016: 41-42). 
However, Crack’s investigation is limited to a few 
self-regulatory instruments of which only 
international NGOs can be part. 
 
In light of this, the list of the challenges faced by 
CSOs in complying with self-regulation cannot be 
considered exhaustive, neither can it be said that 
the effectiveness of self-regulation has been 
adequately investigated especially in terms of 
verifying whether self-regulatory instruments 
meet their expected outcomes/objectives. Despite 
their tremendous contribution to the literature, 
none of above-mentioned studies has tried to 
examine the matter of effectiveness against self-
regulation’s own objectives/expected outcomes. 
Indeed, prominent scholars have warned that 
‘future efforts should begin to assess the 
effectiveness of self-regulatory systems in 
achieving their desired outcomes and improving 
nonprofit performance’ (Gugerty et al, 2010:10).  
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To sum up, there is still a question within the 
literature that remains largely unanswered: is self-
regulation effective in achieving its own 
objectives? When assessing the effectiveness of 
self-regulation, one must ask not only whether — 
and to what extent — CSOs comply with voluntary 
standards but also why they fail to do so. This 
article aims to provide an answer to these 
questions.  
2: Rationale for the Case-Study and 
Methodological Framework  
To answer to the research questions formulated 
above, this research has looked into the practices 
of Italian CSOs. Italy has been chosen as a case 
study for three reasons. First, the “Mafia Capitale” 
scandal (December 2014) has undermined the 
credibility of CSOs revealing a network of 
corrupted relationships between CSOs, criminal 
gangs and political parties. 
 
Secondly, the Italian government has recently 
reformed the third sector through the ‘Riforma 
del Terzo settore, dell’impresa sociale e per la 
disciplina del Servizio civile universale’ (Third 
Sector Reform 2014-2017). Thirdly, a new wave of 
self-regulatory initiatives is currently emerging to 
restore the credibility of the third-sector, thus 
providing an invaluable opportunity to analyse the 
genesis of self-regulation. In particular, this 
research has looked at La Carta dei Valori (‘CDV’) 
developed by Forum Terzo Settore Lazio (‘FTS’). As 
better documented in section 3 of this article, The 
CDV is a checklist of indicators with a focus on 
digital transparency requiring CSOs to disclose a 
series of information on their webpages. 
 
Methodologically, the test of effectiveness on the 
CDV was performed employing the blueprint of 
the One World Trust (London) (Obrecht, 2012). 
This blueprint has been employed in this research 
because it indicates precisely how to measure the 
effectiveness of civil society self-regulation in the 
light of its own objective(s). The alternative would 
have been to opt selectively for either the 
economic or institutional approach. In that 
respect, the blueprint provides a multidimensional 
account to assess self-regulation effectiveness 
accommodating both the economic and the 
institutional approach. Within this blueprint, self-
regulation effectiveness is conceptualised as 
follows: a) successful signalling (change in the 
perception of initiative’s targeting stakeholder); b) 
authenticity (CSOs comply with standards set by 
self-regulation); c) improved quality (changes in 
the CSO, its relationships, or its programmatic 
effectiveness, outside of the standards set by self-
regulation). Based on the drivers motivating the 
adoption of a given self-regulatory instrument, 
researchers can choose which one, among the 
three conceptualisations of effectiveness, would 
fit more their investigation. Additionally, the 
blueprint indicates that there are two factors that 
influence the effectiveness of self-regulation: a) 
the robustness of the regulatory architecture that 
oversees norm-compliance; b) the operational 
context (in terms of political restrictiveness of civil 
society freedoms) in which the instrument is 
adopted. 
 
The test of effectiveness on the CDV has been 
performed into two complementary steps. In Step 
I, the analysis was focused on regulatory body, 
drivers and regulatory structure of the CDV (Figure 
1). First, the investigation has looked into the 
regulatory body (FTS) that developed the CDV 
(Who made it?). Despite the blueprint does not 
contemplate this sub-step, it is important to 
ascertain whether the regulatory agent has 
structural capacities to enact self-regulatory 
norms within the sector. Subsequently, this study 
has identified the motivational drivers which have 
influenced the adoption of CDV (Why was it 
adopted?). This sub-step is vitally important to 
determine the CDV’s expected benefits and to 
guide the definition of effectiveness towards one 
or more understandings of the concept. After 
that, it was critically assessed the CDV’s regulatory 
structure (How does it work?). As to the 
operational context, it was taken from granted 
that Italy has no political restrictions on civil 
society as it stands from the Freedom House 
measurement of political and civil freedoms 
(Freedom House, 2018). It is for this reason that 
self-regulation is likely to take place in any sort of 
model or form.(i) 
 
In Step II, the effectiveness of the CDV was 
measured focusing on expected benefits (shaped 
based on drives as emerging in Step I) and 
expected outcomes (how benefits are achieved) 
using appropriate and measurable indicators to 
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verify behavioural changes in terms of successful 
signalling, authenticity and improved quality 
(Figure 2). For this investigation, improved quality 
– which is a broad category supported by flexible 
indicators within the One World Trust blueprint– 
was narrowly understood as mere conformance 
with the CDV’s standards, overlapping with the 
conception of effectiveness as authenticity. The 
rationale behind this choice is that CDV was 
adopted primarily to send a positive signalling to 
public opinion and to the legislator. Consequently, 
conceptualising and measuring effectiveness as a 
successful signalling was of primary importance. 
Basically, it is the self-regulatory instrument itself, 
through its drivers, that guides the researcher 
towards the adoption of a specific understanding 
of effectiveness, excluding the other conceptions 
available. In addition to this, this study has 
extensively dealt with the concept of effectiveness 
as authenticity, exploring not only whether — and 
to what extent — CSOs comply with self-
regulatory standards, but also why CSOs fail to do 
so.  
2.1: Data Gathering and Analysis 
Considering the numerous questions addressed 
both in Step I and Step II, a wide range of 
empirical data have been gathered and analysed. 
All the data was gathered during extensive 
fieldwork that took place in Rome between April 
and September 2017. 
 
Qualitative Interviews with Network’s 
Representatives  
In order to develop an in-depth understanding of 
both the genesis and the way the CDV works, and 
due to the lack of documentary sources on the 
drafting process and on the sanctioning and 
monitoring system of the CDV, a semi-structured 
interview was conducted with the former 
spokesman of FTS Lazio, Mr. Gianni Palumbo 
together with an informal recorded chat with 
Professor Antonietta Cosentino (University of ‘La 
Sapienza’ Rome), who was member of the Panel 
of Experts (Comitato Scientifico) that drafted the 
CDV.  
 
Quantitative Data: The Edelman Trust Barometer, 
EURISPES Report and Data on Donations 
In terms of successful signalling, the main aim of 
the CDV was to increase public trust in civil society 
targeting public opinion in general, rather than a 
specific stakeholder.(ii) Public trust was measured 
through two indicators: a) public opinion’s 
perception of civil society and b) rate of donation 
(whether it is increased or decreased). The 
Edelman Trust Barometer (2016) together with 
the 2016 Annual Report on Italy released by The 
Institute for Political, Social and Economic Studies 
(EURISPES) has been acquired to assess public 
trust in civil society. As to the rate of donation, the 
latter was measured relying on the Annual Report 
(2017) of the Italian Institute for Donations 
(Istituto Italiano Donazione). 
 
Legal Ananlysis of Third-Sector Reform  
The second aim of the CDV was to send a 
successful signalling to the legislator, who had 
been drafting the Third-Sector Reform for almost 
three years (2014-2017) with the “Mafia Capitale” 
scandal occurring in the middle of the drafting 
process in December 2015. An assessment of the 
final text of the Third-Sector Reform was 
necessary to evaluate whether CDV has been 
effective in sending a positive signalling to the 
Italian Government in declining a strict State 
regulation for CSOs. In order to evaluate the 
strictness of national regulation of CSOs, scholars 
have designed an index that takes into account 
the three factors: 1) barriers to entry; 2) the ability 
to engage in advocacy and political activity; 3) the 
scope of economic activity (Bloodgood et. al., 
2014). Other scholars have also considered an 
additional factor to the ones mentioned above, 
that is, the level of State supervision over CSOs 
(Sidel & Moore, 2006). The higher the bar is within 
these key four factors, the stricter the regulatory 
environment is for CSOs. Based on this, a strict 
government regulation consists, either jointly or 
separately, in an intrusive legislative inference 
with the right to freely form and run a CSO, in 
policy measures imposing conditionalities on CSOs 
to engage in legitimate advocacy and/or economic 
activities, tax policies aimed at deterring donors 
from supporting CSOs, and limiting the 
supervision functions over CSOs only to 
governmental bodies. To understand whether the 
Italian Third-Sector Reform represents a strict 
legislation for CSOs, focus has been brought on 
new norms that deal with registration, 
transparency and reporting duties as well as on 
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those rules that define the subjects called to 
exercise monitoring functions both at a sectoral 
and at an organisational level. To do so, a legal 
analysis between abolished and new norms was 
performed focusing on nature, content and aim of 
these core rules. 
 
Compliance Rate: CSO Websites Quantitative 
Analysis  
As to authenticity and improved quality, the 
effectiveness of a self-regulatory instrument 
depends on its compliance rate, which is 
determined by the extent to which CSOs comply 
with set standards. The CDV asks CSOs to publish a 
series of information online. 25 websites out of 27 
CSOs belonging to the FTS Lazio were scrutinised 
using the relevant checklist of indicators to 
calculate the overall compliance rate. Two CSOs 
were excluded from the investigation as the first 
one recently joined the network, whereas, the 
second one did not have a webpage. If the item 
was disclosed online, the relevant box on the 
checklist was ticked with a “Y”. Otherwise, the box 
was marked with an “N”. On the one hand, the 
compliance rate for each CSO is given by the sum 
of the items that appears online [those marked 
with a “Y”] which is then divided by total number 
of items that should appear online [24] multiplied 
by 100. On the other hand, the compliance rate 
for each indicator is given by the sum of the same 
items disclosed online [“Y”] on various websites 
divided by the total number of CSOs [25] 
multiplied by 100. Webpages were scrutinised in 
April 2017 and then again in September/October 
2017. No substantive change was reported during 
the first and the second scrutiny. Names of CSOs 
were withheld, and they have been assigned a 
random number from 1 to 25. 
 
Non-compliance and Sanctioning System: 
Qualitative Questionnaires and gathering Data in 
CSOs Network 
The analysis on authenticity would incomplete 
without knowing the reasons faced by CSOs in 
disclosing information online and without 
knowing if (and how many) CSOs have been 
subjected to sanctions for non-compliance. Due to 
the lack of documentary sources on the 
sanctioning system of the CDV, Mr. Palumbo 
(former spokesmen of FTS Lazio) was asked a few 
interview questions on the matter. In order to 
map out the reasons behind the non-compliance, 
a series of qualitative questionnaires have been 
distributed among delegates during three network 
meetings organised between April and June 2017. 
The questionnaire was anonymised and was 
composed of two simple questions aimed at 
providing rich qualitative information on ‘which 
indicators were the most difficult to comply with’, 
and ‘why’ this would be the case. In total, eight 
questionnaires were filled by delegates who 
attended the three meetings. In that respect, it is 
important to note that the attendance rate was 
very low. The number of delegates for each 
meeting was between three and seven, each of 
them representing one organisation, despite the 
network being composed by 27 CSOs in total. The 
reason behind such a low participation was due to 
the fact that FTS Lazio was in a transitional phase: 
a new spokesman was recently appointed at 
beginning of April 2017 and new board members 
were appointed at the beginning July 2017. 
 
According to my informants within FTS Lazio, the 
network was profoundly divided on the 
nomination of board members (including the 
spokesman) and such division resulted in an 
internal fragmentation. Consequently, a special 
sampling strategy was adopted to ensure that all 
sides of the network were represented: two 
representatives of CSOs, who were not attending 
meetings, were deliberately sought and 
interviewed individually (Morse, 1991). This was 
done in order to ensure that the analysis would 
not be distorted towards one perspective: that of 
the more active and sympathetic CSOs who were 
attending all meetings and filled in questionnaires. 
The total sample comprises of eight 
questionnaires (cited with the letters A to H) and 
two interviews (cited with the letters I-J) 
representing 37% of FTS Lazio membership. As to 
data analysis, evidence emerging both from 
questionnaires and interviews was organised and 
grouped based on the two question categories: a) 
‘what’ indicators were the most difficult to comply 
with and b) ‘why’ this would be the case. During 
this analytical stage, emerging evidence was read, 
considering notes and other materials gathered 
during FTS meetings when the questionnaires 
were filled. Themes and sub-themes were 
subsequently developed in light of the findings 
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emerging from the CSO websites quantitative 
content analysis (considering both the compliance 
rate per organization and per requirement) and 
from the interviews conducted with Mr. Palumbo 
and Prof. Cosentino. 
2.2.: Article Structure and Preview of the 
Findings  
Because the test of effectiveness is performed 
into two successive steps, this paper is structured 
accordingly. Section 3 focuses on drivers, 
regulatory body and structure of the CDV (Step I). 
In section 4, the test of effectiveness (Step II) on 
the CDV takes place, measuring the expected 
benefits (shaped based on the drives as emerging 
in Step I) and expected outcomes (how benefits 
are achieved) to verify behavioural changes in 
terms of successful signalling, authenticity and 
improved quality. 
 
To preview the outcome of this test of 
effectiveness in terms of successful signalling, it 
will be concluded that the CDV has been effective 
in protecting the sector’s autonomy against 
hypothetical legislative interferences. At the same 
time, it could not be determined whether the CDV 
has been effective in increasing public trust, as 
public trust depends on many factors that are 
independent from the development of a self-
regulatory instrument. As to authenticity and 
improved quality, it will be submitted that even if 
quantitative findings indicate a medium/low 
compliance rate, qualitative findings suggest that 
there can be many reasons behind non-
compliance that sometimes do not depend 
entirely on a CSO’s commitment to comply with 
voluntary standards. In this context, a distinction 
between objective and subjective reasons of non-
compliance is drawn. Finally, the conclusive 
section outlines the paper’s contribution to 
academic and societal discourse on self-
regulation, an agenda for future research and 
research limitations.   
3: Step I: Regulatory Body, Drivers and 
Structure of the CDV  
3.1.: Who made it? 
FTS Lazio is a regional network of CSOs belonging 
to the biggest Italian umbrella organisation (Il 
Forum Nationale del Terzo Settore) which 
represents 81 national CSOs operating across the 
Italian territory (Forum Terzo Settore, Chi Siamo). 
Founded in 1997, FTS is the oldest civil society 
network established in Italy. FTS Lazio is a pluralist 
network which brings together different kinds of 
CSOs in terms of size, nature, mission and actives. 
This diversity often results into polar types of 
CSOs (e.g. ecclesiastical and secular associations; 
national and international CSOs). In 1998, FTS 
obtained the observer status in several State 
institutions and it has been consulted by the 
Italian legislator to draft and negotiate third-
sector policies. In light its characteristics, FTS Lazio 
can certainly be considered a network with 
structural capacities to define self-regulatory 
norms. 
 
3.2.: Why was it adopted? 
There are typically three drivers to self-regulation: 
low stakeholders trust, restrictive State regulation 
and need for capacity building and learning 
(Obrecht, 2012). In this specific instance, the 
scandal “Mafia Capitale” triggers widespread 
skepticism in CSOs and the need for capacity 
learning as confirmed by Mr. Palumbo:  
 
 “The CDV was primarily developed to safeguard 
the reputation of the third-sector which was 
damaged by the ‘Mafia Capitale’ scandal... the 
credibility of the third sector was drastically 
undermined even if allegations of corruption 
concerned few CSOs compared to the majority 
that operate transparently and legally. Usually it 
takes up to several years to build a solid 
reputation but few seconds can be sufficient to 
ruin it: one bad apple spoils the whole barrel.” 
 
Therefore, a detailed account of the facts 
characterising the scandal “Mafia Capitale” is 
indispensable. In December 2014, the Attorney 
General of Rome issued an arrest warrant against 
44 people (Tribunale Roma, Ufficio VI GIP). 
According to the police, a criminal network of 
politicians, criminals and CSO’s managers took 
advantage of recent influx of immigrants through 
its political connections within the City Council of 
Rome, securing lucrative public contracts to 
manage several migrant’s centers of the Italian 
capital city. In an intercepted phone call released 
by investigators, the head of a social enterprise 
was quoted saying: ‘Do you have any idea how 
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much I make on these immigrants? (...) drug 
trafficking is less profitable! We closed this year 
with turnover of 40 million but our profits all 
came from the gypsies, on the housing emergency 
and on the immigrants!’ (Noack — The 
Washington Post, 2014). 
 
Public trust is obviously a key component for the 
third-sector and when it is compromised by public 
scandals, this leads to two consequences: tighter 
government regulation and low stakeholder trust, 
especially donor scepticism (Obrecht, 2012). 
 
Indeed, the scandal ‘Mafia Capitale’ pushed the 
Italian Government to address the issue of 
accountability of CSOs through the Third-Sector 
Reform (August 2017) which was already a key 
point of the government’s agenda before the 
scandal. Before the scandal, the main aim of the 
Reform was to implement coherent legal policies 
among Italian CSOs, because the legislation was 
profoundly outdated and fragmented into several 
acts (Vaccario, & Barbetta, 2017). After the 
scandal, issues of accountability and supervision 
over the sector could no longer be ignored by the 
legislator and therefore were incorporated into 
the reforming agenda. The second driver that led 
to the adoption of the CDV was the Third-Sector 
Reform that – while was being drafted – was 
characterised by numerous uncertainties 
regarding the way in which the Government 
intended to address issues of accountability, 
transparency and supervision of the third-sector. 
 
3.3.: How does it work? 
Immediately after the scandal, the Spokesman of 
FTS Lazio appointed a Panel of Experts (Comitato 
Scientifico), composed by academics and well-
established practitioners, so that they could find 
the most appropriate solution to address the 
widespread lack of trust in the sector. The Panel 
of Experts opted for a code of conduct, focused on 
digital transparency, namely the CDV. This was 
subsequently approved by the General Assembly 
of the network on the 15th of July 2015. 
Considering that the main driver behind the 
genesis of the CDV was to send a successful 
signalling to public opinion, this self-regulatory 
instrument frames accountability primarily as a 
matter of transparency, demanding CSOs to 
disclose a series of items on their websites.   
In terms of normative content, the CDV is 
structurally divided into two parts. Part I affirms a 
set of principles (such as non-discrimination, 
participation, transparency, fair-competition), 
whereas, Part II consists of a checklist which 
requires CSOs to disclose various items on their 
websites such as financial budget, meetings with 
stakeholders, performance reports and board 
directors’ CVs. The CDV states that the checklist 
represents a “minimum standard”, as the items 
are normally available to all CSOs. As to its scope, 
the CDV targets all 27 CSOs belonging to FTS Lazio: 
if a CSO is part of the network, then it is expected 
to comply with it. 
 
Concerning the nature of the CDV, the latter is 
formally a checklist of indicators. This could 
wrongly imply that this self-regulatory instrument 
is merely a self-assessment tool and there is no 
monitoring system set to verify norm-compliance. 
Instead, an independent committee (Commissione 
di Garanzia) within FTS Lazio was empowered to 
verify motu proprio whether CSOs comply with 
the checklist conducting periodical assessments 
(at least once every two years) of their websites.  
 
Aside from this monitoring mechanism, the CDV is 
equipped with a sanctioning system. In the case of 
non-compliance, the committee invites CSOs to 
redress their omission within 30 days. Otherwise, 
the following disciplinary measures may be taken: 
a) recall, b) disapproval, c) suspension, or d) 
expulsion. These measures are governed by the 
principle of progressive sanctions, according to 
which an organisation must be properly warned, 
through recall or disapproval, prior to being 
suspended or expelled by the network. With 
regard to expulsion, the committee has to submit 
a motivated proposal to the Board of Directors of 
FTS Lazio. The expulsion can be appealed to the 
General Assembly of FTS that decides on the basis 
of an inquiry formulated by Board of Directors. 
 
As to the drawing-up process of the CDV, Prof. 
Cosentino explained that each group of items 
(Part II) corresponds to a principle stated in Part I. 
Essentially, the checklist of indicators 
operationalises the principles. She also made clear 
that the items contemplated in the checklist come 
in pairs, and consequently they are not on their 
own. On a practical level, this implies that the 
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items can be crosschecked: basically, if an item 
appears online (e.g. in a financial budget), then a 
subsequent item should appear as well (e.g. 
source of funding). During her interview, Prof. 
Cosentino clarified that a useful source of 
inspiration in drafting the checklist of indicators 
was the first-ever performance report published 
online by Italian business companies. As it will be 
shown later in this paper (section 4.4.4), there is a 
deliberate effort of the Panel of Experts to change 
the institutional culture of CSOs by bringing an 
accountability paradigm that did not develop 
fundamentally from CSOs’ activities. Prof. 
Cosentino also stressed that the checklist of 
indicators was then adapted to the third-sector 
dimension and its requirements were made 
sufficiently generic in order to be applicable to all 
the different CSOs, in light of the diversity of the 
network. However, research findings (section 
4.4.1) will demonstrate that a few voluntary 
requirements contemplated in the checklist fail to 
accommodate organisational diversity.    
4: Step II — Testing the Effectiveness of the 
CDV 
4.1: Successful Signalling: Increasing Trust in Civil 
Society? 
According to EURISPES Report (Table 1), public 
trust in voluntary associations (associazioni di 
volontariato) declined to the lowest point since 
2010, the year in which it had reached its peak 
(82%), prior to increasing again in the following 
year (2015). Despite the negative trend in 2014 
due to the scandal, it is important to highlight that 
voluntary associations remained the most trusted 
entity compared to other actors over nine years 
(2007-2016). Similarly, the Edelman Barometer 
(Table 2) shows that the perception of trust in 
NGOs among the informed public fell dramatically 
between 2012 and 2014, losing more than ten 
percentage points (from 74% to 62%) and then 
began to rise in the following years (2015-2016) 
gaining those ten percentage points lost 
previously (from 62% to 71%). Just as the 
EURISPES Report, the Edelman Barometer 
confirms that, despite public trust in CSOs was 
very low in 2014, civil society was still the most 
trusted actor compared to public institutions, 
media and business sector.   
According to data of the Italian Institute of 
Donation (Table 3), the rate of donation remained 
stable (23%) for four consecutive years (2011-
2014) and then it dropped down in 2015 after the 
scandal (21%) until it reached its lowest level ever 
in 2017 (19%). The chart reports a constant 
negative trend indicating that Italian third-sector 
lost more than six million of donors in 12 years. 
 
Overall, trust in civil society did increase a little 
after the CDV was adopted, whereas the rate of 
donation is dramatically dropping year on year. 
Consequently, if one tries to understand whether 
the CDV has succeeded in restoring public trust in 
CSOs based on the above data, the answer would 
not be entirely positive. 
 
Realistically, it takes many years to build up a 
good sectoral reputation and only one bad move 
can be enough to lose it (Marschall, 2014). Public 
trust in civil society is influenced by many factors 
which are independent from the development of 
self-regulatory instruments such as good 
organisational performance or the integrity of 
CSOs’ leaders. Similarly, there are many reasons 
why the Italian third sector lost six million donors 
in the last twelve years, the most important of 
which was the economic recession that affected 
many Italian families. 
 
Another important factor is dictated by the limits 
of the current accountability agenda that relies 
primarily on information-based regulation. For 
instance, previous research has found that charity 
ratings did not considerably influence donations 
(Szper & Prakash, 2011) and that positive ratings 
have a slight positive effect on donations, but bad 
ratings have no effect at all (Sloan, 2009). Other 
researchers have shown that most donors do not 
rely on charity watchdog rating (Cnaan et al, 
2011), while earlier studies have documented that 
even if there is a correlation between the 
adherence to self-regulation initiatives and 
increased donations, this correlation is dependent 
on pre-existing levels of public trust (Bekkers, 
2003). Consequently, donations tended to 
increase when CSOs had high a degree of trust 
prior to the development (or adherence) to self-
regulatory standards (Bekkers, 2003). 
 
It is for these reasons that a scholar went as far as 
claiming that ‘although transparency has an 
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important place in a world rapidly moving toward 
expectations of open data, it alone does not 
appear to produce significant changes in behavior 
in (…) donors’ (Phillips, 2012: 812). A recent study 
has also demonstrated that a good portion of 
existing accountability frameworks are built upon 
the model of rational trust, according to which 
CSOs supply information and develop 
transparency policies to allow donors to rationally 
assess whether CSOs will keep their accountability 
commitments, which will affect their decision to 
donate resources (Keating & Thrandardottir, 
2017). However, this model of rational trust 
explains partially why donors trust CSOs, and 
therefore social models of trust should be taken 
into account too (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017). 
In a nutshell, social models of trust suggest that 
where there are common social attributes (such 
as shared values, or a solidarity feeling of working 
towards common goals) between donors and 
CSOs, donors will trust CSOs with far less 
information than might be otherwise expected 
(Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017). This in turn 
explains why CSOs have been consistently seen as 
highly trustworthy despite a historical lack of full 
transparency that the current accountability 
agenda is meant to deliver (Keating & 
Thrandardottir, 2017). In light of the above 
reasons, it would be reasonable to claim that the 
success or failure in restoring public trust cannot 
be solely attributed to the CDV. 
 
4.2.: Successful Signalling: is the 2017 Third-Sector 
Reform a strict regulation? 
In July 2014, the Council of Italian Ministers 
approved a bill aimed at reforming the third 
sector. The main purpose of the Reform was to 
modernise a fragmented and outdated legal 
framework. In June 2016, the Italian Parliament 
issued Law n. 106/2016 delegating to the 
Government legislative functions to finalise the 
Third-Sector Reform. In August 2017, the Third-
Sector Code finally came into force. 
 
The law-making process lasted for almost three 
years and it involved contributions from political 
parties, trade unions, universities, practitioners 
and CSO networks (including FTS). According to 
official figures released by the Government, 1,016 
subjects were consulted (Ministero delle Politiche 
Sociali e del Lavoro). Since the beginning of the 
drafting process, FTS considered the Reform as a 
positive step towards the modernisation of the 
sector (Pavolini, 2014). The Reform contributed to 
the harmonisation of the Italian third-sector 
through three key passages. Firstly, it provides a 
code – one single body of law – that, through its 
114 Articles, abolishes the previous overlapping 
legislations located into different legislative acts. 
In doing so, the code identifies common 
characteristics among CSOs and it provides an 
exhaustive list of activities of public interest (e.g. 
health care, human rights, social assistance, 
scientific research, international cooperation and 
development) locating the entities carrying out 
such activities between the market and the State. 
Secondly, the new legislation aggregates various 
legal definitions of CSOs (e.g. foundations, 
voluntary associations, social enterprises, 
philanthropic entities, civic association etc.) under 
a common umbrella definition: third-sector 
organisation. Thirdly, it introduces a National 
Registry of Third Sector, abolishing the regional 
registries, that is managed by the Ministry of 
Welfare and Labour. Only those entities complying 
with the requirements set by the code can be 
listed into the National Registry and will be 
consequently entitled to receive tax exemption. 
 
In order to fully understand whether the code 
represents a strict legislation for CSOs, new 
transparency and reporting duties were focused 
upon as well as on subjects called to exercise 
monitoring functions both at a sectoral and 
organisational level. As already pointed out in 
Section 2, a legal analysis between abolished and 
new norms was conducted focusing on nature, 
content and aim of core rules. This is succinctly 
summarised in Figure 3. 
 
As to financial and transparency duties, the 
Reform extended the duty to the drawn-up annual 
financial budget to all CSOs with an income above 
220,000 Euros (Article 13, 1), establishing a system 
of financial reporting to the National Registry 
(Article 13, 7). Instead, those CSOs carrying out 
predominately business activities to achieve 
charitable purposes have to report their financial 
performance to the Chamber of Commerce 
(Registry of Business Entities). Prior to the Reform, 
the obligation to the drawn-up financial budget 
was fulfilled only by some organisations (e.g. 
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International-NGOs) depending on their legal 
status and regardless of their income. It should be 
noted, however, that CSOs still do not have an 
obligation to publish their financial budget online 
under the new legislation. Despite this, all CSOs 
with an income above 100,000 Euros are required 
to publish the annual salary of board members, 
managers and employees on their websites 
(Article 14, 2). Prior to the Reform, there was no 
such duty. 
 
With regard to performance reporting, CSOs with 
an income above a one million Euros are obligated 
to publish an annual performance report called 
‘Social Budget’ (Bilancio Sociale), under Article 14, 
1. The latter is a descriptive document, originally 
developed in the area of corporate social 
responsibility, through which both profit and non-
profit entities highlight results achieved (in light of 
their primary aims and mission) as well as the 
benefits they produced for each stakeholder, 
paying particular attention to social and 
environmental challenges. The publication of this 
report usually relies on the voluntary commitment 
of an entity. Under the abolished legislation, there 
was no reference to Social Budget. 
 
As to the monitoring bodies, the Reform 
conferred on three agencies supervisory 
functions, each of which is required to oversee the 
fulfilment of legal requirements on different 
levels: a) an inspection/monitoring body (Organo 
di Controllo); b) the Ministry of Welfare and 
Labour Policies; and c) national networks of CSOs. 
 
At an organisational level, the new law requires 
CSOs to form an internal inspection/monitoring 
body (Organo di Controllo) that oversees 
compliance with organisational, legal and financial 
norms and, simultaneously, assesses whether the 
organisation is managed efficiently in light of its 
mission and charitable aims (Article 30, 6). This 
body can also conduct internal inspections (Article 
30, 8). The establishment of this new body is 
mandatory for those CSOs who have more than 
five employees and with income above 220,000 
Euros for two consecutive tax years. Under the 
abolished law, CSOs were asked to set up a 
monitoring body within their own structures only 
if their income was above 1,032,913.80 Euros for 
two consecutive tax years. The same duty was 
also in place for bank and lyric foundations 
regardless of their income. 
 
At a sectoral level, the Ministry of Welfare and 
Labour Policies is now empowered to monitor 
CSOs registered within the National Registry 
(Article 92). Initially, the Italian legislator was 
planning to establish an ad hoc independent 
authority — like the Charity Commission in 
England and Wales — to exercise supervisory 
functions over the sector, but such a proposal was 
subsequently abandoned due to the lack of public 
funding (Brusini, 2013). The establishment of this 
authority was deemed too expensive. 
Practitioners and representative entities of the 
sector (including FTS) were considering the 
establishment of an independent authority as a 
positive legislative proposal. Basically, the 
argument in favour of such proposal was that an 
independent authority would have been more 
institutionally appropriate and better equipped 
than a governmental body in exercising 
supervisory functions over the sector. In the end, 
attributing supervisory powers to the Ministry of 
Welfare and Labour Policies did not cause any 
negative reaction from CSOs, because this political 
agency was exercising supervisory functions on 
CSOs before the Reform came into force. 
 
Under Article 93, the Ministry of Welfare and 
Labour Policies should encourage national 
networks of CSOs to promote means of self-
regulation through which these entities can 
exercise supervisory functions over their associate 
organisations. Under Article 96, national networks 
should possess technical and professional 
capacities/criteria in order to exercise supervisory 
functions over their associate organisations. A 
Ministerial Decree will be issued by the Ministry of 
Welfare and Labour Policies to determine 
technical and professional criteria to be met by 
national networks to exercise supervisory 
functions. Within the same Decree, the 
Government will also clarify the application 
process through which national networks of CSOs 
can apply to be authorised to exercise supervisory 
functions. To date, no such decree has yet been 
issued by the relevant Ministry to clarify these 
regulatory aspects.  
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Through the above norm, the legislator has 
formally recognised and welcomed self-regulation 
as a complementary means of accountability to 
supervise CSOs, emphasising the role national 
networks can play in that respect. Essentially, the 
Reform has introduced new legal requirements 
that apply to the clear majority of CSOs and 
expanded the range of subjects called to exercise 
supervisory functions, including networks of CSOs. 
The new legislation has also made existing legal 
requirements stricter. In fact, CSOs are now 
subjected to stricter transparency and financial 
requirements compared to business enterprises, 
self-employers or political parties. For example, a 
business entity is required to publish its Social 
Budget only if it has an income of 20,000,000 
Euros (under EU Directive 2014/95) whereas the 
head of a law firm, who earns more than 100,000 
Euros, is not asked to publish his/her annual salary 
online. However, the Reform cannot be 
considered as a strict regulation. As already noted 
section 2 of this article, aggressive State 
regulation consists, either jointly or separately, in 
an intrusive legislative inference with the right to 
freely form and run a CSO, in policy measures 
imposing conditionalities on CSOs to engage in 
legitimate advocacy and/or economic activities, 
tax policies aimed at deterring donors from 
supporting CSOs, and limiting the supervision 
functions over CSOs only to governmental bodies. 
Obviously, this has not been the case of the Italian 
Reform. The new requirements are certainly strict, 
but their purpose is to make the whole sector 
more transparent and responsible. The Italian 
third sector has grown exponentially in the last 
two decades in terms of the number of CSOs 
formed, and it also expanded significantly the 
range of social services provided. By performing 
well and by expanding the range of social services 
provided, the Italian third sector became more 
exposed to clientelism, corruption and criminal 
infiltration. The scandal “Mafia Capitale” clearly 
proved this point. Consequently, the introduction 
of stricter legal requirements was deemed 
necessary to avoid similar phenomena in the 
future. 
 
Overall, the extent to which the CDV has 
successfully prevented the implementation of 
undesirable State regulation cannot be adequately 
assessed, as the new law cannot be labelled as 
aggressive legislation neither was there an 
attempt to implement strict policies while the 
Reform was being drafted. However, given the 
numerous uncertainties that characterised the 
drafting process – especially in terms of how strict 
the new legal requirements would have been in 
the final text – the CDV was used strategically as a 
mechanism of preventive self-defence against 
hypothetical legislative interferences to the 
sector’s autonomy, which were not unlikely to be 
implemented because of the scandal. Essentially, 
CSOs sent a clear message to the legislator 
through the definition of self-regulatory norms: 
the sector is capable of self-supervising itself 
through non-binding norms aimed at making CSOs 
more accountable and transparent. Therefore, any 
attempt of over-regulation aimed at subjecting 
CSOs to the mere supervision of an external 
political agency would have been seen by CSOs 
themselves as an intrusive interference into the 
sector’s independence. In that respect, the CSOs 
viewed the introduction of self-regulation within 
the new legislative framework optimistically and, 
as soon as the relevant amendment was 
incorporated in the Reform, FTS released an 
official statement declaring: 
 
‘We consider the introduction of forms of self-
regulation for the third-sector very positively. This 
was a request we made from the beginning of the 
legislative consultation and we believe that [self-
regulation] is the most suitable instrument for our 
world. We really like the idea of accountability 
and transparency that passes through self-
regulation for the large networks of associations’ 
(Tutto Non-Profit, 2015). 
 
Considering that the new legislation 
accommodates the idea of self-regulation, and 
because of the key role that both networks and 
organisations can now play in that respect, the 
CDV has succeeded in affirming the importance of 
self-regulation as a tool of accountability in 
monitoring the sector. This implies that State-
based regulation and self-regulation could 
complement one other when it comes to sector 
supervision and, more importantly, that self-
regulation can be used strategically to send a 
successful signalling to the legislator while third-
sector policies are negotiated and drafted. 
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4.3.: Authenticity & Improved Quality: CDV 
Compliance Rate, Monitoring and Sanctions  
In terms of authenticity and improved quality, the 
effectiveness of a self-regulatory instrument 
depends on its compliance rate, which is 
determined by the extent to which CSOs comply 
with industry standards. As shown in Table 4, the 
overall compliance rate stands at 45%. The CSO 
with the highest individual compliance rate 
managed to comply with 75% of the items of the 
CDV, while, the worst performer complies with 
only 10% of them. Despite cross-national 
comparisons hardly being able to be performed 
due to the lack of systematic research on the 
matter, a study conducted in 2012 about Spanish 
NGOs that, based on research that used similar 
requirements to assess their websites, obtained 
an overall digital transparency level of 30% 
(Rodriguez et al, 2012). Similarly, a more recent 
study on British-based NGOs working on 
international development, dated 2015, revealed 
that only 41% of them disclose online governance 
and financial information (BOND, 2015). 
 
As to compliance with individual requirement, 
Table 5 shows that the lowest scoring 
requirements are environmental permits and 
other actions taken to protect the environment 
(4%). These are followed by CVs of board 
members and the type of employment contract 
stipulated with workers (both stand at 8%). 
Meetings with stakeholders represent the highest-
scoring requirement (82%), followed by the 
disclosure of consultative meetings with public 
administrations (78%) and publication of 
Partnership I and II (68%). Given the lack of 
documentary sources about the number of 
sanctions issued by the committee in the case of 
non-compliance, Mr Palumbo was asked to 
provide such data when interviewed. So far, the 
committee has not issued any sanctions, and it 
has never exercised its supervisory functions even 
if, under the CDV, it is required to do so at least 
once every two years. Obviously, these 
dysfunctionalities in terms of monitoring and 
sanctioning can cast doubts on the credibility of 
the CDV as a genuine voluntary club. When 
questioned about this matter, Mr Palumbo has 
clarified that issuing sanctions in the case of non-
compliance could contradict — as it is almost 
antithetical — the whole of concept of network 
that is, by definition, deeply grounded on the 
concept of cooperation among members. When it 
comes to voluntary clubs, scholars have in fact 
highlighted that the threat of sanctions is normally 
a good sign of a club’s credibility (Prakash & 
Gugerty, 2010). However, at the same time, 
voluntary clubs sponsored by CSOs themselves — 
like FTS Lazio — may not want to acquire a 
reputation of being severe and adversarial 
through imposing sanctions to their members 
(Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). In a similar vein, there 
can even be a fear that, by issuing a sanction for 
non-compliance, the reputation of the club as a 
whole could be weakened, despite the sanction 
being directed towards a few ‘bad apples’ 
(Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). In terms of cohesion 
and network unity, clubs sponsored by CSOs 
themselves may have a greater impact if they 
retain CSOs with imperfect compliance within the 
club because they can still exercise leverage over 
CSOs keeping their members together (Prakash & 
Gugerty, 2010). If the monitor brings any 
enforcement action for non-compliance, it risks 
paradoxically diminishing the reputational value of 
the club to external observers or even to 
compromise the unity of the club and therefore it 
was suggested that monitoring could perhaps 
pledge secret enforcement (Galle, 2018). 
 
4.4.: Obstacles, Barriers and Challenges to Norm-
Compliance 
The analysis will be partial and incomplete 
without knowing the reasons behind non-
compliance as well as practical obstacles faced by 
CSOs in disclosing information online. As will be 
shown below, the findings point out that there are 
many reasons that refrain CSOs from complying 
with the CDV which do not entirely depend on 
organisational commitment to adhere to 
voluntary standards. Basically, non-compliance 
can be of two sets of reasons: objective and 
subjective. Non-compliance is due to objective 
reasons (or obstacles) when it is related to the 
normative quality of self-regulation, regardless of 
the organisational commitment to comply with 
voluntary norms. In this case, non-compliance is 
dictated by the content of the norms themselves, 
which fail to apply to some CSOs. On the contrary, 
non-compliance is due to subjective reasons when 
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it is exclusively related to an organisational failure 
to comply with voluntary standards, even if there 
is a reasonable but intrinsically subjective motive 
behind it (such as a lack of organisational 
resources or an ideological hostility towards the 
idea of self-regulation). 
 
4.4.1.: Objective Non-Compliance: One Size-fits-all 
Approach, Lowest Scoring Requirements and Lack 
of Item 
The CDV applies indiscriminately to all CSOs 
belonging to FTS, a network that brings together 
organisations very different from each other in 
terms of size, area of activity and type. For this 
reason, the drafters of the CDV decided to 
accommodate organisational diversity through the 
definition of ‘generic and flexible indicators’ (Prof. 
Cosentino) that should be applicable to every 
organisation. Despite this, a couple of self-
regulatory norms fail to apply to some 
organisations or, in most extreme cases, to the 
vast majority of them. These self-regulatory norms 
have been drafted following a one-size-fits-all 
approach, assuming erroneously that they can 
apply to all CSOs regardless of their nature. 
 
The reference is in primis to the lowest scoring 
requirements (4%) that, as shown in Table 5, are 
a) environmental permits and b) other actions 
taken by CSOs to protect the environment. 
Normally, a non-profit entity must hold 
environmental permits from a local authority only 
if it produces goods or carries out activities that 
could potentially cause pollution. Other than this 
exceptional case, CSOs are not required to hold 
any sort of environmental permit. Considering 
that a small portion of CSOs belonging to FTS Lazio 
is involved in the production of goods, it is likely 
that the compliance rate (4%) for this specific 
requirement is directly proportional to the actual 
number of CSOs that are required to hold 
environmental permits under national legislation. 
With a similar reasoning, it can be argued that a 
CSO would be in a position to report publicly 
‘other actions that has taken to protect the 
environment’ only if it is an environmentalist 
group or alternatively if the organisation produces 
goods that could have an impact on the 
environment.  
In some instances, the failure to comply with the 
CDV is associated with the lack of an item at 
organisational level that needs to be disclosed 
online. This is typically the case for prizes awarded 
to CSOs and/or to individuals working for them, in 
which the compliance rate is slightly higher than 
50%. This trend indicates that more than half of 
the CSOs belonging to FTS received a formal 
recognition for their work done. Intuitively, it 
could be argued that the remaining half, or a 
smaller portion within it, does not comply with 
this requirement because it was never awarded 
any prize. In practice, it is likely that recently-
formed CSOs or those who are badly managed fall 
into that category. 
 
4.4.2.: Subjective Non-Compliance: Lack of 
Resources and Prioritisation 
Nowadays, CSOs are called to report their actions 
towards a variety of stakeholders aside from 
carrying out their charitable works. When it comes 
to reporting, time and resources available can 
significantly influence to whom CSOs should 
report their actions, as different stakeholders 
require the employment of different means of 
accountability (Brown & Jagadananda, 2007). 
Evidence from the field suggests that CSOs 
prioritise legal and tax reporting over self-
regulation and beneficiary accountability, because 
a failure to do so would result in legal or financial 
liability: 
 
“We would like to focus more on our charitable 
work and organise more public meetings with our 
beneficiaries to plan activities, discuss campaigns 
or assess the quality of our services. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough time and 
we have to prioritise disclosure statement and 
legal reports… these activities take a lot of time 
off… If we fail to comply with such mandatory 
requirements, we would be held liable” (Delegate 
FTS Lazio, I). 
 
This statement essentially re-confirmed (Ebrahim, 
2003) that a government which provides the 
regulatory environment within which CSOs 
operate, has a significant leverage to guarantee 
accountability compared to a self-regulatory body 
or a network such as FTS. In a similar vein, the lack 
of financial resources forces CSOs to focus 
primarily on their work:  
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“Due to the lack of financial resources, we are 
currently investing more energies, time and 
human resources on our charitable work rather 
than focusing on self-regulation” (Delegate FTS 
Lazio, B). 
 
Another reason for non-compliance is the 
prioritisation of other self-regulatory instruments 
over the CDV as it emerges from the following 
statement: 
 
 “Information appears on our organisation’s 
website regardless of the CDV… we did not publish 
the financial budget though… we paid more 
attention to another code of conduct, which was 
developed in close cooperation with the public 
administration, focused on performance 
reporting” (Delegate FTS Lazio, D). 
 
According to this research respondent, a code of 
conduct developed in co-regulation with the 
public administration is perceived as more 
valuable than the CDV. The reason behind this 
preference rests on the idea that reporting 
organisational actions to the public administration 
is more beneficial than disclosing information 
online to the general public. Essentially, an 
organisation can prefer one self-regulatory 
instrument to another on the basis of regulatory 
structure and the body (or stakeholder) to which 
actions must be reported. In this specific instance, 
the public administration is preferred to public 
opinion, and performance reporting is considered 
more important than online transparency. 
 
4.4.3.: Subjective Non-Compliance: Disclosing 
Managers’ CVs 
Under the CDV, the first item that is supposed to 
appear online is the CV of people managing the 
organisation, such as the president, vice-
president, director and members of board of 
directors. CV disclosure enables stakeholders to 
know the professional background of managers, 
as the credibility of an organisation is to some 
extent shaped by the skills and experience of 
individuals leading it. Table 5 indicates that the 
overall compliance rate for this requirement is 
one of the lowest (8%). Rather than publishing 
CVs, most CSOs provide on their webpages the 
name and contact details of members of board of 
directors together with an organisation chart. 
To understand the reasons behind the lack of CVs 
online, focus should be brought on a debate that 
took place, when the CDV was being drafted, 
between the governing bodies of the network and 
CSO representatives. When Mr Palumbo was 
asked whether FTS Lazio experienced any tension 
between different organisations in drafting the 
CDV (and if so, what would he say the main fault 
lines were), he replied: 
 
 “While drafting the CDV we encountered 
resistance, especially from International-NGOs, in 
requiring CSO managers to disclose their CVs 
online. The reason behind such resistance, which 
we then overcame, was that some practitioners 
lead CSOs while working for public institutions or 
having previously served governmental bodies. 
From a legal perspective, an individual is allowed 
to work for a public administration and direct a 
charity simultaneously, as long as he/she does not 
get paid for his/her charitable work carried out.” 
 
It appears that the failure to disclose CVs is a 
burning issue among CSOs (especially for 
international-NGOs) and that CSOs were 
deliberately obstructing the codification of this 
disclosure requirement within the CDV checklist, 
whereas now they are actively sabotaging 
compliance with it. This trend of non-compliance 
essentially highlights a long-standing problem 
within the sector: revolving doors between 
politics, public administration and the third-
sector. In that respect, it is important to note that 
the phenomena of revolving doors concerned 
many notable NGOs operating worldwide and 
consequently it should not be seen as an isolated 
Italian trend. For example, Human Rights Watch 
former advocacy director Tom Malinowski, served 
as a special assistant to US President Bill Clinton 
prior to his appointment, which he then left after 
being nominated as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Democracy, Human Rights & Labour under 
John Kerry (Alternet, 2014). Similarly, Save the 
Children former chief executive Justine Forsyth 
and Oxfam trustee David Pitt-Watson were both 
former advisors to Labour’s leaders Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown respectively (The New 
Internationalist, 2014). Overall, the failure to 
comply with this requirement is related to a 
structural feature that appears to be a widespread 
and systematic trend among CSOs.  
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4.4.4: Subjective Non-compliance: Lack of 
Participation in Drafting the CDV and Ideological 
Hostility towards Self-Regulation 
Another challenge to norm-compliance is related 
to the way in which this self-regulatory instrument 
was developed. As noted in section 3.3, the CDV 
was drafted by a Panel of Experts who identified 
the requirements applicable to CSOs. During the 
drafting stage, CSO representatives were 
consulted sporadically, and subsequently they 
ratified the final version of the CDV. This way of 
working was seen negatively by some CSOs who 
complained about their lack of participation in the 
drafting process: 
 
 “Empowering a panel of experts to define self-
regulatory norms took power away from the ruling 
bodies of our network. Even if there have been 
moments of consultation between the panel and 
the network during the drafting process, the 
experts left a technocratic imprint on self-
regulatory norms. Empowering a panel of experts 
of such important function made practitioners 
think that their contribution to the CDV was 
pointless and, in the end, we [practitioners] did not 
realise how much each of us should have 
committed in drafting this instrument” (Delegate 
FTS Lazio, J). 
 
The lack of involvement of the CSOs in drafting 
the CDV is viewed as a sort of “expropriation of 
functions”, as the body empowered to draft the 
CDV should have been composed by practitioners 
or alternatively, it should have been one of the 
ruling bodies of the network (e.g. network 
assembly). This is why self-regulatory norms are 
labelled as “technocratic”. The lack of involvement 
of practitioners in setting self-regulatory 
standards undermines the idea of self-regulation 
in addition to highlight an obstacle for norm-
compliance; basically, the CDV is viewed by the 
research respondent as an instrument for CSOs 
but not as a code of conduct written by CSOs. 
 
Finally, there was a practitioner who considered 
the definition of common standards of behaviours 
as the product of professional elite of activists, 
which can be hardly accepted by the most 
traditionalist of Italian associative culture: 
 
 “The increasing attention on defining common 
standards of behaviour can be seen as the triumph 
of certain ‘aristocratic activists’, who want to 
report their actions primarily to institutions and 
public opinion... [such a way of thinking] neglects 
the mass popular association culture that 
developed at a grassroots level and left its mark in 
history” (Delegate FTS Lazio, I). 
 
Rather than identifying practical obstacles to 
norm-compliance, this research respondent 
pointed out an ideological refusal to self-
regulation that, due to its “aristocratic roots”, is 
incompatible with history and culture of certain 
CSOs. Both respondents suggest however, that 
there can be resistances in bringing an 
accountability culture in the third sector that has 
an obvious expert’s identity, who was deeply 
influenced by the business world in the drawing 
up process of the CDV (see section 3.3), and that 
did not genuinely develop from CSO’s activities. 
Conclusion  
This paper contributes to academic and societal 
debate on self-regulation in many ways. First, it 
represents the first systematic academic study on 
CSO’s self-regulation in Italy. To my knowledge, a 
systematic and comprehensive study on CSO self-
regulation in Italy has never before been 
conducted. Despite the narrow geographical 
scope, findings would be relevant not only to 
Italian CSOs but also to those countries where 
CSOs are under pressure because of their weak 
accountability performance, and to those contexts 
where civil society self-regulation is still an 
emerging trend. The research findings would be 
equally important for those contexts in which 
CSOs are exposed to criminal infiltrations (e.g. 
Mexico). Beyond the analysis on the effectiveness 
of self-regulation, the magnitude of Mafia Capitale 
scandal shows that CSOs can be exposed to 
corruption despite civil society is regarded, by 
definition, as an antidote to corruption (UNODC, 
2019). The “Mafia Capitale” scandal also revealed 
the cultural and social dimension of organised 
crime, which operated within a wide institutional 
and civil relational context, and the complexity of 
how organised crime works in practice, given that 
local gangs were able to interact with, penetrate 
and manipulate the Roman civil society to achieve 
illicit purposes. At the same time, the 
accountability narrative of the “Mafia Capitale” 
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scandal helps us to develop a better 
understanding of how accountability standards 
are negotiated in the aftermath of a charity 
scandal. 
 
In that respect, this paper also contributes to the 
academic discourse studying the inter-play 
between State-based regulation and self-
regulation from a comparative perspective (see, 
for example, Breen et. al., 2017) as findings 
indicate that the self-regulation can be employed 
as a tool to protect the sector’s autonomy against 
hypothetical legislative interferences while third-
sector policies are negotiated and drafted. The 
new Italian legislation accommodates the idea of 
self-regulation, emphasising the key role that 
CSOs networks can now play in self-monitoring 
the sector. On the contrary, self-regulation has 
been heavily criticised in the aftermath of charity 
scandals that took place elsewhere in the world, 
especially in the case of Oxfam GB in Haiti 2018, in 
which self-regulation was labelled as ill-suited in 
providing adequate oversight of what emerged as 
the central problem in the Oxfam case (Phillips, 
2019). In its report on the sexual exploitation and 
abuse in the British aid sector, The House of 
Commons International Development Committee 
concluded that the sector and the legislator 
should move beyond self-regulation, because it 
failed to ensure that safeguarding standards are 
being upheld by CSOs (House of Commons 
International Development Committee, 2019). 
 
Secondly, the paper enriches the academic debate 
by providing a theoretical model to explain non-
compliance, drawing a distinction between 
objective and subjective reasons of non-
compliance. Findings suggest that there are many 
reasons behind non-compliance which, in some 
instances, do not depend solely on a CSO’s 
commitment to comply with voluntary standards 
(objective reasons of non-compliance). The most 
important policy implication arising from this 
theoretical distinction is that the overall 
compliance rate should be adequately calculated, 
or even discounted, when it comes to objective 
non-compliance. In other words, the overall 
compliance rate (which currently stands at 45%) 
would be higher if it was recalculated, exempting 
from the calculation those voluntary requirements 
that are grouped under the category of objective 
non-compliance as they fail to be applicable to 
CSOs. This theoretical model can be further tested 
and applied to other self-regulatory instruments.  
 
Lastly, this paper represents the first academic 
attempt to apply the One World Trust blueprint to 
test the effectiveness of self-regulation 
considering its own objectives. In doing so, it 
provides a methodological paradigm that can be 
used by other researchers to measure self-
regulation effectiveness in other settings. Even if 
quantitative data (e.g. data on compliance and 
those on public trust and donations) can be 
generalised statistically, qualitative data on non-
compliance are limited to a small sample of CSOs 
belonging to FTS Lazio (37% of FTS Lazio 
membership). This is the main research limitation 
that has been attenuated by purposefully 
selecting respondents to represent all the diverse 
sides of the network under investigation. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
136 
Endnotes 
(i): Based on an extensive review of existing 
instruments developed worldwide, the One World 
Trust blueprint (Obrecht, 2012; 20-21) indicates that, in 
a hostile political environment, it is likely that CSOs 
adopt initiatives with no formal system of enforcement 
and reporting, as the presence of the latter might 
require too many resources in contexts where CSOs 
already struggle to operate. In supportive operational 
contexts, characterised by no policy restriction on 
CSOs, self-regulation can instead take place in all 
different models. 
(ii): “Public Trust” is a controversial concept and there 
is room for contestation over its exact definition, and 
yet it is a key concept contemplated in the 
accountability agenda of many watchdogs. On this 
particular aspect, see Keating and Thrandardottir 
(2017) where the authors make a lengthy list of 
examples. For instance, the Charity Navigator (2016) 
emphasises that “charities that are accountable and 
transparent are more likely to act with integrity and 
learn from their mistakes because they want donors to 
know that they’re trustworthy.” Similarly, State 
regulatory institutions, such as the Charity Commission 
of England and Wales (2016) are tasked with inspiring 
“public trust and confidence in charities’ and 
‘[enhancing] the accountability of charities to donors, 
beneficiaries and the general public.” The Edelman 
Trust Barometer – which is actually employed in this 
research to measure public trust in civil society – 
emphasises how “trust is critical as a driver of 
[organisational] reputation.” All of these statements 
stress ‘why’ trust is relevant for private and 
institutional actors and ‘why’ people should care about 
it. However, none of them define the concept of trust 
itself. In the social sciences, a well-packed scholarly 
definition of trust is the one provided by Sapsford et al 
(2015; 2017): “Trust is a feeling of confidence in those 
around you and/or in things unseen – in the abstract 
‘other people’ who are not named or visualised but 
whose assumed reliability underlies transactions 
outside the sphere of immediate family and friends. It 
is also a cognitive state, the perception of 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical systems and relations 
as regularities on which one may depend.” This 
definition was employed by researchers to measure 
trust in post-Soviet countries as well as in the Middle 
East (together with corruption and social cohesion).  
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